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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the process of building knowledge about what we term as behavioral 
acquisition, which explores defense acquisition from a behavioral standpoint, including the impact 
of psychology, organizational behavior, and politics. Behavioral acquisition studies the decisions 
acquisition professionals make in Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition programs. The paper 
focuses on one aspect of these decision processes in the defense acquisition environment: 
behavioral biases. In three defense acquisition programs studied, we find strong evidence that 
planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and recency bias affected the 
management and decision-making within these programs. This research helps us better 
understand and predict how acquisition professionals and senior leaders think and make 
decisions about program strategy, managing resources, and leading people. A key element in this 
perspective is that important insights into these decisions derive from models in which agents are 
not fully rational. Behavioral acquisition is analogous to behavioral finance, which has 
successfully applied social science theories—especially from psychology—to improve the 
accuracy of predictions about the behavior of actors across the entire financial landscape.    
 
Keywords:  behavioral acquisition, systemic biases, program management, decision making, 
defense acquisitions, culture, leadership, hierarchies 
Introduction 
Program managers (PM) are at the center of the defense acquisition process, yet there 
are substantial gaps in our knowledge about how PMs actually make decisions about the 
programs they manage on behalf of the defense community. Given the size of the defense 
acquisition portfolio in the United States, better knowledge of the intricacies of decision-making 
by PMs might be highly valuable for informing improvements in defense acquisition processes in 
the future, including for PM training and education. This paper contributes to the process of 
building knowledge about what we term as behavioral acquisition, which explores defense 
acquisition from a behavioral standpoint, including the impact of psychology, organizational 
behavior, and organizational politics. 
Our paper focuses on one particular aspect of these decision processes in the defense 
acquisition environment: behavioral biases. These biases can be categorized into cognitive and 
emotional biases, but their common root is in the ways in which human brains use their limited 
capacities to process information. The results are decision-making capabilities that are, at times, 
stunning in their elegance and effectiveness in real world environments (Gigerenzer et al.,1999; 
Klein, 2009) and, at other times, shockingly flawed and error prone (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
That both outcomes are possible is one of the geniuses of the human brain. We provide a 
detailed treatment of four well-known behavioral biases and their scope to occur in acquisition 
programs. We examine the scope issue by doing a deep-dive into three significant acquisition 
programs using a case study-based approach to determine whether there is prima facie 
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evidence that behavioral biases play a role in decision-making in acquisition programs. The 
programs are 
• Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH) program: Joint rapid acquisition effort executed in 
response to urgent warfighter needs leveraging new technologies. 
• Joint Common Missile (JCM) program: Joint major defense acquisition program executed as 
a development effort with a deliberate acquisition approach with approved requirements. 
• Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program: Service-specific major defense acquisition 
program executed as a development effort with a deliberate acquisition approach with 
approved requirements. 
A key observation we make is that there is a lack of research studying the effects of 
behavioral biases on decision-making in the defense acquisition environment. Kiesling and 
Chong (2020) studied decision biases within acquisition programs by tracing the presence of 
keywords indicating specific biases from Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) summary 
documents of the acquisition programs. However, the research did not study primary source 
program data (Kiesling & Chong, 2020). Therefore, at this point, it is sensible to motivate 
research on this topic with two basic questions: (1) How do behavioral biases affect decision-
making in acquisition programs? And (2) to what extent do behavioral biases affect acquisition 
outcomes? The three acquisition programs studied were all wide-open to bias creeping into 
them in the forms of the planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and 
recency bias. What the empirical cases illustrate best is that acquisition programs are 
environments where there is abundant opportunity for behavioral biases to play a significant role 
in decision-making; they are a perfect setting where one would expect to see these biases 
occurring. Furthermore, in some instances, the data is more suggestive. Not only was the 
opportunity in place, but there is at least some evidence that these biases were playing a role in 
program decision-making in ways that probably affected program outcomes. The data here is 
circumstantial but, when pieced together, the fact-pattern is suggestive of this conclusion. We 
cannot say anything more definitive than this based on the case data we have available, but 
certainly the patterns we see are consistent with biases playing a role. 
It is worth pointing out that in our study we focused on the setting in which real 
acquisition managers do their work rather than the acquisition manager role in the abstract. This 
means we look at the acquisition challenge of juggling performance, schedule, and budget from 
a pragmatic perspective rather than as some kind of abstract rational optimization game. Recent 
acquisition reform directives and statutes require data-driven analysis and decisions, which put 
an emphasis on rational optimization. But whatever technologies of analysis are the fad or 
fashion of the day (and in the defense acquisition profession there have been many, over the 
years) decision-making inevitably still consists of boundedly rationally individuals operating 
inside a collective entity (a program) trying to make better decisions that deliver improved 
organizational outcomes (Levinthal, 2018). Hence, despite calls for more rationality, the 
organizational and political dimensions of decision-making still matter very much, and we shall 
see that these dimensions interact with behavioral biases in particular ways. 
Background and Literature Review 
Defense Acquisition Overview 
Defense acquisition professionals facilitate the development, testing, procurement, and 
fielding of capability to warfighters. The program manager (PM) is at the center of defense 
acquisition, whose purpose is to deliver warfighter capability. The PM is responsible for cost, 
schedule, and performance (commonly referred to as the “triple constraint”) of assigned 
projects—usually combat systems in the Department of Defense (DoD). The PM has a 
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hierarchal chain of command (or authority) through the DoD in the executive branch. PMs report 
directly to a program executive officer, who reports to the service acquisition executive (an 
assistant secretary for that service—either Army, Navy or Air Force), and who reports to the 
defense acquisition executive (the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment). Depending on the program’s visibility, importance and/or funding levels, a 
program’s milestone decision authority (MDA) is assigned to the appropriate level of the chain of 
command. 
Programs within defense acquisition require resources (primarily funding) and contracts 
(for execution of work) with industry. Congress provides the resources for the defense programs 
through the annual enactment of the defense authorization and appropriations acts, which 
become law and statutory requirements. The PM, through warranted contracting officers, enters 
contracts with private companies within the defense industry. As a backdrop to this complex 
acquisition environment for PMs, three decision support templates exist to guide programs: one 
for the generation of requirements, a second for the management of program milestones and 
knowledge points known as the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (often referred to as little “a”), 
and a third for the allocation of resources. Each of these decision support systems is 
fundamentally driven by different and often contradictory factors. The requirement generation 
system is capability needs-driven based on an evolving threat—requiring a responsive 
acquisition system. The resource allocation system is calendar-driven, with Congress writing an 
appropriations bill and the president signing the bill every fiscal year—providing control of 
funding to Congress and transparency to the public and media for taxpayer money. The 
Adaptive Acquisition Framework is event-driven by milestones—based on commercial industry 
best practices of knowledge points and off–ramps supported by the design, development, and 
testing of the systems as technology matures and integration and manufacturing challenges 
occur. The combination of the PM triple constraint, chain of authority, acquisition environment, 
and decision support templates provides a framework to view U.S. defense acquisition, referred 
to as the Defense Acquisition Institution (or big “A”) and depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Defense Acquisition Institution or Big “A” 
  
Due to the inherent complexity of the development, procurement, and fielding of 
sophisticated weapons systems that are required to operate reliably in challenging military 
environments, acquisition programs often fail to deliver required performance capabilities within 
cost and schedule constraints. Root causes of acquisition program failures (schedule slips, cost 
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defined requirements, immature technology, integration challenges, poor cost estimating, 
unstable budgets, poor schedule planning, and schedule pressure from annual appropriation 
limitations. But an underappreciated reason for acquisition program failures and understudied 
part of big “A” is the “people part” of defense acquisition, which may have the largest effect on 
improving acquisition outcomes. Behavioral acquisition studies how acquisition professionals 
think, manage, and lead acquisition programs. Behavioral acquisition includes a study of 
organizations and hierarchies, and the intersection of individual behavior, leadership, culture 
and decision-making. In this study, we narrowly focus on how behavior biases affect acquisition 
decision-making at the institutional, organizational, and individuals levels. We recognize that 
decisions at the institutional level (DoD level) are often using a political conceptual model where 
decisions are a result of bargaining games. And decisions at the organizational level (Army level 
or PEO level) are based on the appropriateness of the actions fitting the organizations’ cultural 
norms. Whereas at the individual level (program level), decisions use the rational conceptual 
model where decisions are based on logic and reasoning by assigning pros and cons (or risk 
and rewards) and deciding the best chance of success. We recognize that there may be 
important differences in how biases affect leader decision-making in organizations versus in 
institutions like the DoD. Figure 2 presents the overall model showing the connection of 
hierarchical, leadership, cultural, management, and behavior factors on decision-making and 
program outcomes. The model was adapted from the work of Shore (2000) who studied the 
effect of systemic biases within projects.   
 
 
Figure 2.  Connection of Hierarchical, Leadership, Cultural, Management, and Behavioral Factors on 
Decision-Making and Program Outcomes 
 
Behavioral Biases Relevant to Defense Acquisition 
Research centering on the acknowledgment and study of bounded rationality has long 
recognized that people process information in ways that may lead them to make biased 
judgments (Simon, 1955). Cognitive biases are a two-edged sword: On the one hand they have 
a positive function in helping people to make fast decisions using limited cognitive resources; on 
the other hand, cognitive biases also lead people to make errors in decision-making that 
deviate—often in important ways—from prescriptive (rational) decision-making. It is worth 
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biases is based on comparisons to idealized “small world” rationality whereas in reality all 
decision-making is behavioral (Levinthal, 2011). Furthermore, research has also shown that at 
least some biases are driven by information presentation alone and may be mitigated by 
presenting information in ways that leverage the brain’s information processing skills, rather 
than penalizing them (Gigerenzer, 1991). Nonetheless, a basic premise of research into biases 
is that as the volume and complexity of information increases, people are forced into using 
simplifying tactics that ration the limited cognitive resources they have available (Camerer, 
2011). Hence. they adopt heuristics that ease the cognitive strain they experience. And because 
these heuristics involve rationing how information is processed (in a wide variety of ways) they 
develop systematic patterns of bias in decision-making, as compared to an ideally rational 
baseline (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Research on heuristics and biases is at this point a massive undertaking that has 
identified literally dozens of biases that people are predisposed towards (Kahneman, 2011). The 
objective of this paper is not to review them all but instead to focus on a handful of biases that 
illustrate the value of studying defense acquisition through an explicitly behavioral lens. 
Therefore, we focus on explaining four biases that have been widely studied in the literature 
under various guises: the planning fallacy, over-optimism, recency bias, and difficulty making 
trade-offs. These biases have different roots. Over-optimism and the recency bias are 
straightforwardly cognitive in nature, and their effects manifest in particular ways in acquisition 
programs. In contrast, the planning fallacy and difficulty making trade-offs are the result of how 
human cognitive factors interact with specific group and organizational processes. With all four 
biases, we are ultimately interested in how bounded rationality intersects with complex real 
world settings in ways that deviate substantially from what we might expect based on 
prescriptive rationality. We focus on these biases because the three defense acquisition 
programs we studied are wide open to being affected by all four of them. 
Planning Fallacy 
The planning fallacy addresses the unrealistic optimism about program management 
that numerous studies of program outcomes have documented across many decades in the 
defense, public and private sectors (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Economic theory points to 
multi-level principal–agent issues as a key source of the gap between plans and outcomes. This 
leads economists to suggest that programs typically under-deliver because program managers 
have a vested interest in embellishing program projections to get programs approved through 
specific stage gates (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). Within defense acquisitions, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) reported that PMs are incentivized to develop acquisition strategies 
focused on program approval at the milestone review but not acquisition strategies that could 
later be executed and deliver capabilities (GAO, 2015). There are also behavioral explanations 
for excessive optimism about programs, two of which we explain here: the planning fallacy, 
which occurs as the result of management practices, and dispositional optimism, which we 
discuss in the next section. 
The main claim of the planning fallacy is that independently of other factors, planning 
processes themselves bias manager beliefs and lead them to make program forecasts that are 
too optimistic (Cassar, 2010). Of course, carefully planning projects is essential for good 
management and a legal requirement that establishes the acquisition program baseline of cost, 
schedule, and performance metrics. It is, therefore, problematic (and paradoxical) that planning 
induces a behavioral bias that actually undermines the intended outcome of planning. However, 
the explanation of this behavioral bias is quite simple. Planning processes lead managers to 
build an “inside view” of a project with detailed designs for the implementation of the project 
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). These deep, well-explained designs enhance managers’ 
perceptions of control over the project or program. Thus, they become more confident in the 
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success of their plans (Heath & Gonzalez, 1995; Cassar, 2010). However, planning processes 
inevitably understate unpredictable events that will disrupt and delay the plan. Plans are always 
subject to the dreaded potential of “unknown unknowns” to intervene in what is otherwise 
carefully manicured expectations. Furthermore, the compound probability of even small 
individual disruptions can seriously undermine a program plan (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). 
Hence the fallacy of planning: it actually leads to control expectations and optimism that are 
unwarranted illusions when the context of programs is fully considered. 
It is important to realize that the planning fallacy has deep roots in what are perceived to 
otherwise be good management practices, as well as in cultural characteristics that have their 
origins outside of project management. Control perceptions are central to these roots: managers 
are groomed to believe that their own actions substantially determine the results they get. Our 
accountability systems depend on these beliefs as well as their enforcement through 
bureaucratic oversight hierarchies. Program planning efforts are based on—and tend to 
reinforce—these idealized perceptions of control, resulting in managers typically perceiving they 
have more control over processes and outcomes than they have in reality. These control 
illusions may also lead them to believe they will avoid problems in a project or be able to easily 
overcome problems. What seem like good management practices may just compound the 
planning fallacy. For example, intuitively it seems like a good practice to focus intently on the 
specifics of a particular program, yet this tends to reinforce the “inside view” problem, which 
increases bias. Using incentives also seems like a good idea, yet research indicates that 
incentives also tend to encourage people to focus more intently on their plans, which increases 
bias (Buehler et al., 1997). In reality, the planning fallacy creates biased expectations that mask 
a control gap that will exact a price over the course of most programs. 
Optimism Bias 
In this section we discuss dispositional optimism, which is the tendency of individuals to 
see the world through “rose-colored glasses” or, more formally, their “tendency to expect 
positive outcomes even when such expectations are not rationally justified” (Hmieleski & Baron, 
2009). The extant evidence suggests that in general individuals are over-optimistic, in the sense 
that their expectations for the future are more favorable than they will eventually experience 
(Cassar, 2010). Healthcare studies suggests that a degree of optimism bias is natural and 
healthy, since it tends to be correlated with psychological health and overall well-being. In other 
studies of the general population (Maltby et al., 2008), optimism has been found to be related to 
perceptions of luck (e.g., in global self-assessments luck beliefs are correlated strongly with 
optimism). Optimists expect good things to happen to them; they believe that chance events will 
break in their favor. Furthermore, when chance events happen, optimistic people tend to 
perceive them in a positive light. For example, optimists interpret an event such as narrowly 
avoiding an accident as lucky, whereas pessimists view the same event as unlucky (Hales & 
Johnson, 2018). 
We don’t know of any research that specifically examines the dispositional optimism of 
defense acquisition managers. However, we know that higher than average levels of optimism 
are present among individuals working in other domains that could broadly be construed as 
project or program management. For example, entrepreneurs are involved in start-up projects 
and studies have shown that on average entrepreneurs are distinctly over-optimistic, with some 
studies finding them to be off-the-scales on optimism (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). Scholars have 
related these results to a willingness to initiate action, observing that individuals high in 
dispositional optimism are more willing to forge ahead in the face of daunting obstacles. This 
suggests a distinct selection bias in which optimism bias leads individuals to enter into activities 
for which they have little evidence to base beliefs about their eventual success (Meza & 
Southey, 1996). More difficult programs are more likely to attract more optimistic managers 
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because these managers are more likely to believe everything will work out favorably for them, 
independently of having a plan to achieve success (Scheier et al., 2001). This suggests that 
some degree of optimism bias may be a prerequisite to becoming a program manager, with 
more difficult programs attracting the more optimism biased. 
However, optimism is a double-edged sword. Research suggests that a curvilinear 
relationship between optimism and performance, with a distinct sweet spot. Individuals that are 
low in optimism believe that disaster awaits them in whatever they do. This makes them less 
likely to select into activities with uncertain outcomes in the first place and, if they are selected, it 
leads them to focus on negative information and have low motivation to complete tasks. On the 
flipside, over-optimistic individuals tend to focus only on positive information (they pick out good 
news stories), see positives in ambiguous situations (always look on the bright side), make 
suboptimal decisions such as setting unrealistic goals (the now infamous “stretch” goals), are 
less likely to learn from failure (i.e., update their beliefs), are more likely to persist with failing 
courses of action for longer periods (thus wasting resources) and be more at risk of escalation 
of commitment (another infamous problem in projects). Fundamentally these propensities tie 
optimism bias to less effective program performance. However, the extant evidence does also 
suggest that the same bias contributes positively to resiliency (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). 
Recency Bias 
If you have ever had a project or presentation go badly right before your annual review is 
due, you already intuitively understand the recency effect: the widely recognized bias where 
recent data is given disproportionate emphasis in judgments (Beach & Connolly, 2005). 
Recency effects tend to occur when individuals process large amounts of information over time, 
which leads them to use heuristics to make judgments. This heuristic processing aids in sorting 
through the information but also introduces biases with regards to which information individuals 
pay the most attention. Because of this systematic variation in attention, with only a recent 
subset of all the available information getting the most attention, individuals make suboptimal 
decisions. 
There are a number of explanations for why the recency effect occurs. It is more difficult 
to remember information that is older because of memory decay. In order to access or 
reconstruct information stored in memory, people rely of categorization processes. If information 
necessary for deciding has been stored in faulty or irrelevant categories, it may affect an 
individual’s ability to recall it. Over long time spans, these issues become more pronounced 
compared to the accessibility of recent information, which suggests that this bias worsens if 
recent information is processed alongside much older information. It is worth noting that social 
processes that legitimate newer as compared to older data as more relevant and worthy of 
consideration may add to recency effects deriving from individual bias. In these cases, the bias 
may derive from social, political, and organizational factors, as well as personal ones. 
 While we do not know of any study that has examined the recency bias in defense 
acquisition, there are relevant studies that investigate this bias in the management literature. 
Recency bias has been most studied by accounting scholars interested in the effects that 
information presentation has on accounting judgments. Researchers widely use Hogarth and 
Einhorn’s (1992) belief-adjustment model in these studies. The model proposes that people 
revise their beliefs using an anchoring and adjustment process. Current opinion is the anchor 
and new data potentially causes adjustments. In essence, the model suggests that when 
evaluating mixed information, individuals average the current piece of data and anchor. This 
results in more weight being placed on the latest information received (e.g., a recency effect). 
Accounting scholars find that many accounting judgments do seem to exhibit this effect, unless 
there is some mitigating factor. One review found that 21 out of 25 studies found some evidence 
of recency bias (Kahle, 2005). Studies have searched for factors that mitigate recency bias. 
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Some research has suggested that experience may mitigate recency bias but results of studies 
are inconclusive on this factor. Other studies (e.g., Kennedy, 1993) have found some support 
for accountability as a mitigating factor (e.g., recency effects are reduced when subjects are 
required to justify your decisions to others by explaining your reasoning in writing). These 
mitigating factors should be considered in understanding the complete effects of recency bias in 
the defense acquisition environment. 
Trade-Offs Bias 
Central to program management are trade-offs between program cost, schedule, and 
performance. Normative decision theory has proposed various methodologies for making such 
trade-offs by confronting them systematically and holistically, typically through some version of 
cost–benefit analysis. But as we already observed, the reality is that all decision-making is 
behavioral (Levinthal, 2011), and therefore models premised on idealized rationality quickly 
bump-up against the realities of bounded cognition in organizational settings, which is the 
setting in which defense acquisition processes actually have to work. Under these 
circumstances, it is germane to ask how acquisition managers actually make decisions. A basic 
understanding among behavioral researchers is that individuals avoid making trade-offs 
wherever possible (Slovic, 1975) because conflicting options are difficult to evaluate (Irwin & 
Davis, 1995). The lack of internal capability for judging trade-offs in the ways prescribed (e.g., 
by cost-benefit analysis) is a key reason that these analyses are typically externalized in the 
form of spreadsheets, diagrams, and tables (Clark, 2008). These “decision tools” often involve 
formulating trade-off criteria in numerical values, in order to make options easy to compare. This 
assists in making trade-offs that are otherwise too perplexing for individuals to make based on 
their cognitive capacities. However, behavioral research also notes that the assumptions made 
in financial models are also subject to biases (Lautliev & Menter, 2014).    
Behavioral research suggests that individuals make trade-offs according to a different 
model: reason-based choice (Shafir et al., 1993). In this approach, individuals make conflicting 
choices easier to evaluate by constructing reasons for choices. If necessary, they make a list of 
reasons for choices (a relatively simple mental task) rather than trying to trade off costs and 
benefits across options (a much more complex mental task, typically significantly beyond human 
short-term memory limitations). By constructing reasons, individuals turn difficult-to-reconcile 
characteristics of options into a problem that is more readily comprehensible. Instead of making 
trade-offs, they use the heuristic approach of framing and re-framing an issue until they find a 
dominant option, which avoids the cognitive effort that real trade-offs require. In some cases, 
dominance may be based on a prominent attribute of the options. Hsee (1996) discusses how 
individuals find it easier to evaluate a good reason for purchasing an asset than whether they 
paid the right price for it, which is much harder to discern. If a good reason is not currently 
available for a choice, individuals may simply delay choosing or they may add other options that 
help clarify a dominant option. The essence of reason-based choice is that the human mind 
naturally prefers to find a dominant reason for a choice rather than delving into the complexities 
of cost-benefit analysis. 
Furthermore, it is likely that reason-based choice may be even more important when 
groups are making decisions than when individuals make them. This is important in the 
acquisition world, since programs inherently involve numerous stakeholders and significant 
organizational oversight that means many decisions have to be justified to groups. Therefore, 
while individuals choose using reasons because of cognitive limitations, groups may also prefer 
reasons because of social dynamics (Barber et al., 2003). Accountability and group conflict are 
two explanations why reason-based choice may be affected by social dynamics. Work on 
accountability suggests that reasons become more important when individuals have to justify 
their choices to groups whose respect and approval are important to maintain (Lerner & Tetlock, 
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1999). No one wants to look foolish in front of a group, and good reasons that are simple to 
explain are a way of making sure they don’t. Other work has suggested that reasons based on 
prominent attributes help avoid group conflict because prominent attributes may be less 
controversial (Irwin & Davis, 1995). For example, safety is a prominent and (mostly) non-
controversial attribute in defense acquisition programs; therefore justifying choices based on 
safety (where possible) is likely to cause less group conflict. It is worth highlighting that because 
reasons depend on social legitimacy (i.e., what is accepted and approved of by particular 
groups) navigating organizational landscapes effectively requires having a detailed 
understanding of the nuances about which reasons are broadly acceptable to the community 
(and avoiding those that are likely to cause controversy). 
Acquisition Program Case Studies 
ECH Program 
Combat helmets have evolved over time to offer improved performance because of 
technology advances and manufacturing capability improvements (see Figure 3). Soldiers wore 
the M1 helmet, nicknamed the “steel pot” because it was made from pressed manganese steel, 
from the 1940s through the late 1970s. The M1 helmet was heavy and uncomfortable, and it 
provided little blunt trauma protection. The maturation of ballistic fabrics based on para-aramid 
polymer technology enabled the Army to replace the M1 with the Personnel Armor System for 
Ground Troops (PASGT) helmet in the mid-1980s. These helmets were in the 3–4 pound range 
(lighter than the M1) and provided increased ballistic protection. The shell of the helmet 
consisted of layers of ballistic aramid fabric, the most famous of which is DuPont’s Kevlar®—
resulting in the “Kevlar” or “K-pot” nicknames. The ballistic aramid technology allowed helmets 
to provide not only fragmentation protection from explosions but also small caliber handgun 
protection at a reasonable weight. The Modular Integrated Communication Helmet replaced the 
PASGT helmet on a limited basis. By the mid-2000s, the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) was 
the Army’s primary helmet. The ACH provided Soldiers important performance improvements 
like increased ballistic protection, reduced weight, and better blunt impact protection.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Army research centers teamed with commercial 
industry to mature the next generation of ballistics materials, resulting in the development of 
high molecular weight polyethylene (HMWPE) ballistics fibers that could be weaved into fabrics 
with application to combat helmets. The basis of future combat helmets, both the enhanced 
combat helmet (ECH) and its replacement, the Soldier Protection System future combat helmet, 
rested in HMWPE technology. 
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Figure 3. Evolution of Combat Helmets (Mortlock, 2018) 
 
The ECH effort was driven by the urgent need for a new helmet to address protection for 
Soldiers and Marines against rifle threats in combat and reduce the combat weight. The 
guidance and priorities from the warfighting community and senior leaders were maximum 
protection and weight reduction. HMWPE technology allowed the Army and Marine Corps to 
consider increasing force protection by providing better ballistic protection or decreasing weight 
of the helmets. The basic options considered for the ECH requirements included: (1) maintain 
the protection levels of the current helmets with a reduced weight of up to 20%, or (2) increase 
the protection levels but maintain (or increase) the weight of the helmet. The helmet 
requirements had to balance acceptable minimum risk versus maximum safety for protective 
equipment, and weight reduction (combat load) versus protection (ballistic and blunt force)—not 
be an easy compromise for the program stakeholders. The ECH, however, would not be able to 
address both protection against the rifle threat and reduction in the helmet weight (Trouble 
Making Trade-offs bias). 
To address the schedule aspect of the program, the Army and Marine Corps considered 
the options of pursuing a formal program of record through the deliberate acquisition process 
versus pursuing a rapid acquisition process supported by a directed or urgent requirement 
(Planning Fallacy). Establishing a formal ECH program involved a 4-year time period of 
contracting, development and testing. Year 1 allowed for the refinement, analysis, and approval 
of formal requirement documents and the development of testing protocols. Years 2 and 3 
involved the development and testing of helmet prototypes resulting from competitively awarded 
contracts (cost-plus type contracts) to be awarded to industry companies. Year 4 allowed for the 
Army and Marine Corps to award procurement contracts to the successful companies for the 
manufacture and production of helmets. The alternative to a program of record was to use the 
rapid acquisition process. In rapid acquisition, the Services wrote a directed requirement (within 
a month) for the ECH and awarded competitive contracts (fixed-price contracts for certain 
quantities with production options) to industry within 6 months. Another 6 months would be 
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required to test the helmets. So, ECHs could be on Soldiers’ and Marines’ heads in just over a 
year. With the rapid acquisition option, the new helmet’s requirements would not be 
underpinned by analysis, and the test protocols had to rely on the protocols for current helmets 
because there would be no time to develop test protocols specifically for the ECH (Planning 
Fallacy). This was particularly important for the ECH, which would rely on novel HMWPE 
thermoplastic polymers that might perform much differently than the current para-aramid based 
helmets. For example, ECHs had the potential to lose their rigidity after being shot once and 
potentially offered less protection from multiple shots. Also, the ECH may deform excessively, 
leading to head trauma and skull fractures. There were legitimate testing and safety concerns 
that would have to be addressed during the development, testing, and manufacture of this new 
helmet.  
The ECH program began in early 2009 (as shown in Figure 4) as rapid acquisition effort 
(Planning Fallacy and Over-optimism). The Army and Marine Corps approved urgent 
requirements based on the need for increased protection against enemy rifle threats and set 
broad requirements to include an increase in fragmentation and pistol protection, and rifle threat 
protection—all at the same weight of the current combat helmets. The acquisition strategy was 
a single step development in which competition was encouraged among industry 
manufacturers. The original request for proposal asked for each vendor to deliver test data 
validating their claim that their design met the new ECH requirements for rifle protection. Four 
vendors submitted proposals; however, only one vendor’s design was acceptable. At the end of 
2009, this vendor received a firm fixed price (FFP) contract to produce ECHs to undergo 
government validation testing with contract options for production deliveries after successful first 
article tests. In late 2010, after successful developmental testing, the Army and Marine Corps 
approved the program milestone to enter into low-rate initial production with the selected 
vendor. The decision permitted the production of a small number of helmets to undergo testing 
in order to validate that the contractor could successfully produce the helmets to performance 
requirements. The use of FFP type contracts for the development of the ECH was heavily 
influenced by Better Buying Power (BBP) 1.0, which encouraged a greater use in acquisition 
efforts (Recency Bias). Generally, however, for programs with only top-level warfighter 
operational requirements and with new technology, the use of cost plus–type contracts provides 
industry greater flexibility to innovate, allows the refinement of requirements based on 
knowledge learned in the development, and increases the chance of successfully producing a 
manufacturable, high quality product. In late 2011, the ECH passed the second round of first 
article testing after testing protocols were adjusted appropriately. To meet an aggressive 
production schedule for the Army and Marine Corps, the vendor submitted an engineering 
change proposal for a second and third production line.  It took all of 2012 for the vendor to 
successfully pass the third round of first article testing. 
The testing results demonstrated that the ECH met its requirements and offered Soldiers 
and Marines the potential for greater protection compared to current helmets. After passing 
testing and 4 years since program initiation, in the summer of 2013, the ECH successfully 
received a full rate production decision. The setting of requirements and testing protocols in the 
absence of quantitative analysis led to prolonged schedule, especially important with limited 
funding, intense scrutiny on program cost/schedule overruns, and pressures to field new 
capabilities to the warfighters quickly (Difficulty Making Trade-offs and Planning Fallacy). 
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Figure 4.  ECH Program Timeline (Mortlock, 2018) 
 
The rapid acquisition program required that a directed requirement be written without a 
complete analysis of performance requirements. The new technology leveraged in the ECH 
could provide a 20% lighter (about a ½ pound) helmet while maintaining current protection, or 
could provide limited rifle protection at current helmet weights, or could strive for a substantial 
increase in rifle protection but with added weight. Pressure existed to lighten the fighting loads 
of warfighters in combat with benefits being improved speed and mobility, less fatigue and more 
endurance, and fewer long-term injuries. At the same time, there was the push for more 
capability (in this case, rifle protection), which meant increased weights. The Army and Marine 
Corps struck the easiest most expedient balance of increasing protection while constraining the 
weight to that of current helmets (Difficulty Making Trade-offs and Planning Fallacy)—essentially 
pushing the “easy button” attempting to “go fast” in a schedule-driven effort. 
The testing protocols were important because they were placed in the helmet 
specification in the signed contracts for helmet deliveries and told industry the government 
requirements to be met. This was a typical “chicken or egg” scenario. Helmets with the new 
technology had never been manufactured. The testing protocols can only be established after 
making helmets and fully characterizing those helmets through design limit testing. However, a 
full-scale research and development effort required time and money. The testing protocol for the 
current helmets was refined after more than a decade of development, testing, and 
manufacture. The new technology in helmets behaved differently than the previous technology 
after being shot with a bullet. Thus, the required testing protocols differed. With nothing else to 
go on initially, the ECH testing protocols were set the same as current helmet test protocols 
(Difficulty Making Trade-offs and Planning Fallacy). The subsequent schedule slips in the ECH 
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Programs that involve the application of a new technology inherently include high levels 
of integration, manufacturability, producibility, and quality risk. These programs should guard 
against being primarily schedule-driven (Over-optimism). Time is required to optimize the 
requirements and testing protocols while also encouraging the widest possible participation in 
the program by interested and innovative helmet manufacturers. In this case, an effort that 
originally planned to field helmets within a year took 4 years to reach a production decision—not 
so rapid. The industrial base suffered as the program relied on a sole-source vendor without the 
benefits of competition to keep costs and schedule in check. A program that is knowledge–
driven from a research and development effort that includes many competitors from the 
industrial base may have proven more beneficial and had a similar execution timeline. The 
Services must be realistic about the risks associated with development efforts involving new 
technology and must avoid being primarily schedule–driven rather than knowledge–driven for 
acquisition decision-making. 
The ECH program was initiated as a 1-year rapid acquisition effort that resulted in a 4-
year effort to field a helmet (better than the current helmets) but with less than the theoretical 
possible optimal level of performance at a cost three times that of current helmets because of 
limited competition and low manufacturing levels of a capability and capacity (industrial base 
concerns). The Service’s and the PM’s decision-making in this program was greatly affected by 
Trouble Making Trade-offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism, and Recency Bias. 
JCM Program 
The Joint Common Missile (JCM) program was initiated in the late 1990s. It was a Joint 
(Army, Navy, Marine Corps) effort to replace Hellfire, Maverick, and aviation-launched, tube-
launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles fired from both rotary wing (AH-64 
Apaches, AH-1 Cobras, and MH-60 Seahawks) and fixed wing (F/A18 D/F Super Hornets) 
aircraft. The JCM program had a successful milestone (MS) B in early 2004 with an approved 
capabilities development document (CDD) and subsequently awarded an Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract for a planned 4-year EMD phase. The approved 
JCM acquisition strategy had a planned single-step development approach to meet all required 
capabilities (Difficulty Making Trade-offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism Bias).  
The Army and Navy planned the JCM program for a decade prior to the 2004 Milestone 
B or official designation of the program of record and start of the EMD phase. The science and 
technology (S&T) communities matured the underlying missile technologies through S&T 
objectives and a technology maturation and risk reduction phase. A high-level government work 
breakdown structure described the missile design and used to assess a medium risk 
assessment for the JCM development effort as well as technology readiness level (TRL) 
determinations of 6 for the critical technology elements (CTE) of the missile in support of the 
Milestone B decision. During this same time, the requirements generation system completed 
both a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) and analysis of alternatives (AoA). The CBA and 
AoA supported the approval of the JCM capability development document (CDD), which 
contained key performance parameters (KPP), initial operational capability (IOC) dates, 
acquisition objective (AO), and an average unit procurement cost (AUPC). Simultaneous with 
the technology maturation and requirements solidification, the resourcing plan for a JCM 
program was being worked and funding was planned and programmed. The JCM business case 
analysis supported the JCM program office estimate, the Army and Navy program objective 
memorandum (POM) submissions, and the JCM program was deemed affordable by the Army 
and Navy. However, the independent cost estimate (ICE) by Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(CAIG) that supported the JCM Milestone B decision determined that the effort would take 
considerably longer than planned (from 74–144 months in EMD rather than the planned 48 
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months) and cost considerably more than planned (an AUPC of $153,000 rather than the 
planned AUPC of $108,000) (Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism Bias). 
Despite the ICE conclusions, the JCM acquisition strategy recommended by the Army 
and Navy, supported by the warfighters, and approved by the defense acquisition executive 
(DAE) in the spring of 2004 after a successful Milestone B was a single-step development effort 
that planned to meet all the KPPs (Difficulty Making Trade-offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism 
Bias). Late in 2004 (approximately 6 months after program approval), the JCM program was 
canceled as a program of record, and the effort was eventually renamed as the Joint Air to 
Ground Missile (JAGM) program. In 2015, the JAGM program applied the key lesson learned 
from the failed JCM effort―adoption of an incremental development approach. The JAGM 
program was approved as a program of record and successfully awarded an EMD contract after 
a Milestone B approval in 2015 (11 years after the JCM Milestone B approval). The capabilities 
to be delivered under the JAGM program were greatly reduced from the capabilities desired in 
the JCM program. Figure 5 displays the differences between the JCM and JAGM programs. The 
documented lessons learned emphasized the avoidance of extensive unprioritized 
requirements, multiple threshold platforms, and the fixed-wing F18 platform. The Army and 
Navy lessons applied to the JAGM effort emphasized an incremental development of the 
warfighter’s highest priorities, reduced the threshold platforms, and leveraged the existing 
Hellfire missile warhead and motor to reduce risk, cost, and schedule (Difficulty Making Trade-
offs, Planning Fallacy, Over-optimism Bias).  
 
 
Figure 5. JCM/JAGM Acquisition Strategy Comparison (Mortlock, 2020) 
[note the following acronyms: RW = rotary wing, FW = fixed wing, USA = US Army, USMC = US Marine 
Corps, GFE = government furnished equipment, PPT = precision point targeting, F&F = fire & forget, 
MOUT = military operation in urban terrain] 
 
The plight of the original JCM program approval, subsequent cancellation, and then 
transition to the JAGM program offers an example supporting the GAO (2015) conclusion that 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 107 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
the defense acquisition system often provides incentives for Services and PMs to promote 
successful acquisition strategies (defined as approved and leading to successful milestones) 
rather than sound acquisition strategies (defined as executed within cost, schedule, and 
performance constraints, and leading to fielding capability). Difficulty in Making Trade-offs bias 
makes it difficult for the Services and PMs to develop acquisition strategies to optimally balance 
near-term program milestone approval and long-term program executability in terms of 
maintaining cost, schedule, and performance baselines and delivering capability.  
The Services and the JCM PM basically had two choices to reduce programmatic risk 
when formulating the JCM acquisition strategy―plan more time and money for the effort as 
defined by the warfighter or reduce scope (achieve less performance requirements) for the time 
and money planned. Allocating more money or additional schedule was not considered because 
JCM had a TMRR phase deemed successful and planned EMD phase aligned with funding in 
the Service POMs. A reduction in scope by recommending reducing performance capabilities 
was not considered because that risked losing the support of the warfighting communities who 
strongly supported achieving the full required capabilities (Planning fallacy, Difficulty in Making 
Trade-offs).  
The JCM requirements were well established and supported by years of analysis with a 
set capability need date. The technologies needed to turn those requirements into capabilities 
for the warfighter had matured to the point that they were deemed mature (TRL 6) and ready for 
integration and development work. Additionally, the funding to support the JCM program of 
record for a development and engineering work and procurement of missiles was aligned to the 
required need date (IOC). The PM triple constant of cost, schedule, and performance was all 
synchronized and set within the planned acquisition program baseline (APB). However, for the 
JCM program, a single-step acquisition strategy to deliver all required capabilities was 
eventually canceled and the warfighter received no capability. Had an incremental development 
approach like the subsequent JAGM acquisition strategy been adopted initially, the warfighter 
could have received improved capability more than a decade sooner.   
In the case of the JCM program, the cost and schedule constraints and the ICE 
determinations indicated the need to consider an incremental development approach and delay 
some capability to later increments (Planning Fallacy). The JCM program was canceled, and it 
took more than 10 years for the new JAGM program to pass an Milestone B—this time with an 
incremental approach that leveraged existing government furnished equipment (GFE) 
components and non-development item (NDI) technologies. Meanwhile, during this “lost 
decade,” the warfighter got none of the desired capabilities required. The defense acquisition 
system incentivized the Services and PMs to get an approved milestone—but with a program 
that was soon canceled, failed to meet performance requirements, and delivered no capability. 
The JCM program serves as an example of a program in which the cost, schedule, and 
performance constraints were unrealistically established. The Services and the PM decision-
making were affected by the Planning Fallacy, Difficulty in Making Trade-offs, and Over-
optimism Bias.  
Army Infantry Combat Vehicle Programs 
The Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) remains the backbone of the Army mechanized 
infantry warfighter formations. Developed in 1970s, the Bradley has been upgraded several 
times to offer Soldiers enhanced capabilities; however, since the early 2000s, the Army has 
been trying to replace the BFV due to size, weight, and power constraints that severally restrict 
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Figure 6. BFV Over Time (Roth & Hames, 2019) 
 
One attempt at a BFV replacement was the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) as part of a 
family of eight manned ground vehicles (MGV) within the planned Future Combat Systems 
(FCS) Brigade Combat Team construct for the Army Future Force. The FCS program entered 
the acquisition framework as an official program of record at Milestone B to begin engineering 
and manufacturing development (EMD) efforts in 2003 with a planned Milestone C (low rate 
initial production) in 2010, but the program was canceled in 2009. Figure 7 describes the 
planned ICV as presented at the preliminary design review in early 2009. Over the past decade, 
defense acquisition experts have referenced the FCS program as an example of everything 
wrong with defense acquisition―a canceled program that wasted billions of dollars and 
delivered no capability to warfighters (Pernin et al., 2012). The FCS program was an ambitious 
effort that attempted to integrate technologies using a system-of-systems approach to transform 
the way Army brigades would fight. Additionally, the program started as a Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) effort contracted through other transaction authority (OTA) 
with Boeing and its industry teammate, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). 
The OTA incentivized Boeing to get the Army to an approved Milestone B, to start the formal 
program of record and system development and demonstration phase as quickly as possible. 
The Army planned, programmed, and budgeted funding—at risk if the program was not 
executed on schedule (schedule-driven). Boeing and the Army achieved that Milestone B in 
2003. The OTA also enabled Boeing to become the lead system integrator (LSI) for the FCS 
program of record. Despite warnings from the GAO of immature technologies and lack of 
adequate funding, the Army marched forward until 2009, when the Secretary of Defense 
canceled the FCS program because of affordability concerns, immature technologies, and 
requirements not reflecting the current threats faced by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan (GAO, 
2004). The FCS program was an example of a rush to failure and resulted in no capability 
delivered to the warfighter (Planning Fallacy). The program was also hampered by Difficulty in 
Making Trade-offs and Over-optimism (too many requirements, too many immature 
technologies), as well as Recency Bias (use of DARPA, OTA, system of systems approach and 
LSI concept) to use the latest acquisition reform initiatives despite other more suitable, less risky 
acquisition approaches.  
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Figure 7. FCV ICV in 2009 (Adapted from PdM ICV, personal communication, 2009) 
 
After cancellation of the FCS program in 2009, the Army embarked on the Ground 
Combat Vehicle (GCV) program (see Figure 8) to replace the BFV. At the time, Fort Benning 
served as the home of the infantry, and Fort Knox served as the home of armor. All resources 
that had been supporting the oversight and management of the development of a family of eight 
FCS manned ground vehicles were now applied to the development of the GCV. The Army 
designated Fort Knox as the lead in the defining the requirements for the GCV. The GCV 
program pushed for a materiel development decision and Milestone A in 2010 to begin awarding 
technical maturation and risk reduction (TMRR) contracts to industry. The same two industry 
partners that were teamed together in the FCS EMD phase for manned ground vehicles now 
competed against each other in a TMRR phase for the GCV. The Army began the GCV 
program and awarded FFP type research and development (R&D) contracts to BAE Systems 
and General Dynamics for designs and prototypes. The new vehicle’s requirements called for a 
heavy reliance on mature commercial technologies. Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives 
strongly encouraged and incentivized resulted in awarding FFP type R&D contracts (Recency 
Bias) despite the lack of appropriateness based on the level of system integration complexity 
and risk. 
With the Armor School in the lead for defining the GCV requirements for a BFV 
replacement vehicle for the mechanized infantry, the requirements for GCV resulted in mixture 
of requirements from the BFV, the FCS ICV, the recently fielded mine resistant ambush 
protected (MRAP) vehicles, and the M1A2 Abrams tank. Based on the GCV requirements, the 
program office, the interested industry competitors, and engineers at the research, 
development, and engineering center (RDEC) at the Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM), 
determined that the GCV would weigh between 50 and 70 tons—nearing the weight of the 72-
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Figure 8. GCV as depicted in 2010 (Adapted from PdM GCV, personal communication, 2010) 
 
The GCV had force protection, survivability, and lethality requirements for a mechanized 
infantry vehicle written by armor warfighters or tankers. In subsequent reviews with the 
Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) staff (including the Vice Chief of Staff of the 
Army), the potential weight of the GCV and excessive requirements were highlighted; however, 
the Army pushed ahead and awarded two TMRR contracts based on schedule pressure for 
protecting the planned and programmed resources of the old FCS MGV program (Planning 
Fallacy, Over-optimism and Difficulty in Making Trade-offs). Four years later, the Army canceled 
the GCV program because the vehicle was going to be too big and heavy and had excessive 
requirements. The GCV effort was not focused on the mechanized infantryman—it was focused 
on other Army priorities.  
In recent years, after several failed attempts of initiating the Next General Combat 
Vehicle because of aggressive requirements and lack interest by industry, the Army is trying 
again—this time calling the BFV replacement the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV). 
The OMFV program is susceptible to same behavior acquisition biases (Planning Fallacy, Over-
optimism, Difficulty in Making Trade-offs, and Recency Bias) as contributed to the failures of the 
predecessor BFV replacement acquisition efforts. How can the design and development of a 
mechanized infantry vehicle be optimized for troop transport and protection, lethality, and 
remote autonomous operations simultaneously? The answer is unfortunately, it can’t—this will 
require difficult requirement trade-offs to avoid the planning fallacy and over-optimism bias. A 
vehicle that is optimized for lethal autonomous operations would be an inefficient combat 
vehicle to protect the crew and protect the troops being transported. It appears that Recency 
Bias has also played a significant role in the OMFV program. Is the Army more interested on 
riding the autonomous vehicle hype wave? Or does the Army have other priorities like proving 
the value of the high-profile, newly established Army Futures Command or Next Generation 
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Combat Vehicle (NGCV) Cross Functional Team (CFT)? The acquisition strategy for the OMFV 
program appears to be heavily influenced by Recency Bias. The acquisition strategy leverages 
the newly formed middle tier acquisition (MTA) pathway to avoid forming an acquisition program 
of record to enter the EMD phase after a successful Milestone B. The OMFV program will use 
MTA authorities to rapidly prototype vehicles for experimentation and demonstration and then 
establish a formal acquisition program of record at Milestone C to enter low-rate initial 
production. This strategy is the exact opposite strategy that the GAO has recommended for 
more three decades for major defense acquisition programs—knowledge-based acquisition 
strategies. Defense acquisition programs have routinely rushed to production decisions without 
well-defined requirements, complete detailed design drawings, fully mature technologies, and 
mature manufacturing processes, and without demonstrating production representative systems 
in a relevant operationally environment. The OMFV program is attempting to do in an MTA rapid 
prototyping effort what a major defense acquisition program achieves in a formal EMD effort—a 
classic “schedule-driven” rush to failure. 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Summary 
We studied three defense acquisition programs and found strong evidence that systemic 
behavioral biases affected the management and decision-making within these programs. Table 
1 summaries the research results. The outcomes of the ECH, JCM, and Army Infantry combat 
vehicles programs were affected by planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-
optimism, and recency bias (except JCM). 
Table 1. Summary of Biases Present in Defense Acquisition Programs 
Conclusions 
The presence of the effect of behavioral biases within the management and decision-
making of acquisition programs comes as no surprise. However, the extent and frequency of the 
planning fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and recency bias within the three 
acquisition programs studied sharpens the point on which biases are most relevant within 
defense acquisitions. For the past three decades, acquisition management has been highlighted 
on the GAO’s high-risk list for excessive waste and mismanagement. Notable programs have 
failed to deliver capability, and failed to meet performance, cost, and schedule management 
targets. The root causes of program failure vary from ill-defined requirements, immature 
technologies, integration challenges, poor cost and schedule estimating, and the acceptance of 
too much development risk. Underappreciated and understudied is the effect that the planning 
fallacy, difficulty in making trade-offs, over-optimism, and recency bias have in contributing to 
root causes of acquisition program failures. The better we understand the effect of these 
systemic behavioral systemic biases, the better we can mitigate the risks of program failures.  
The complexity of the defense acquisitions makes study of systemic biases interesting. 
The culture and leadership at different levels of the DoD from the institutional level to the 
organizational level to the program level affect the impact of the biases. In the DoD’s 
Programs Planning Fallacy Difficulty in Making Tradeoffs Over-Optimism Recency Bias
ECH Program √ √ √ √ 
JCM Program √ √ √  
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hierarchical chain of command, the PMs are responsible for the program’s cost, schedule, and 
performance (triple constraint). PMs make decisions for the proper management and execution 
of the program within the triple constraint parameters. However, the PMs do not establish the 
performance requirements, cost, or schedule objectives of the acquisition program baseline—
the Services do. Additionally, PMs report to a milestone decision authority (MDA) who approves 
the program and determines overall program strategic direction. The systemic biases at the 
various levels of the chain of command manifest differently in the decision-making models used 
at different levels. Behavioral acquisition explores defense acquisition from a behavioral 
standpoint, including the impact of psychology, organizational behavior, and organizational 
politics on how culture, leadership, and decision-making affect the management and execution 
of program, as well as program outcomes. 
Recommendations 
For further research, we recommend rigorous study of more acquisition programs that 
can clearly show the distinctions we suspect are in play. We recognize that in the real world 
these distinctions are hard to show, even though we all know what’s going on. Surveys of PMs 
and MDAs are an excellent way to get primary data to understand behavioral acquisition more 
fully. Figure 9 to highlights a model designed to study how the chain of command, culture, and 
decision-making moderate the effect of behavior biases in acquisition managers. 
 
 
Figure 9. Moderator effects on acquisition manager behavior that affect program outcomes 
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